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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Jacob Steele Randall appeals from his conviction, entered 0n a conditional guilty plea, for

On

trafﬁcking in marijuana.

to suppress the

detecting

by denying

Of The

Facts

He

alerted.

years With three years ﬁxed,

also argues that his sentence, to a

was parked

counties

—

excessive.

is

And Course Of The Proceedings

in the

median 0f

Interstate

When he encountered Jacob

When he appeared

t0 decrease his

drove past the patrol

Steele Randall at approximately 8:30

at or

am.

(TL, p. 19, L. 17

below the speed

sitting

in

a

“very

uncomfortable, unnatural driving position, and pressing himself backwards in his seat.”

—

p. 21, L. 11; p. 45, L. 11

and, after Randall

made two

—

p. 46, L. 1.)

Reference t0 “Tr.” are t0 the ﬁle

transcripts

The

titled

— p.

rigid,

(Tr., p.

Trooper Scheierman pulled behind Randall

lane changes Without properly signaling for

trafﬁc stop. (TL, p. 21, Ls. 12-19; p. 23, L. 22

1

limit

speed 0n seeing Trooper Scheierman’s patrol car and, as he

Trooper Scheierman observed him

car,

p. 32, Ls. 14-

86 near the border between Power and Bannock

Randall was travelling eastbound

p. 20, L. 5; p. 52, Ls. 14-17).1

20, L. 6

motion

uniﬁed term 0f seven

Trooper Tyler Scheierman, a K-9 ofﬁcer With the Idaho State Police (TL,
25),

his

roughly sixty—ﬁve pounds of marijuana found in his rental car after a drug-

dog repeatedly

Statement

appeal, he argues that the district court erred

ﬁve seconds,

initiated a

24, L. 10.)

“Appeal Transcripts Volume 1” containing the

of the hearings 0n Randall’s motion t0 suppress, his change of plea, and sentencing.
was captured on Trooper Scheierman’s dash-cam and that recording was

trafﬁc stop

admitted as State’s Exhibit
L. 22.)

Reference t0 ‘EX.

“Randall — 46893

—

1

1’

at the

hearing 0n his motion t0 suppress. (TL, p. 41, L. 20

are t0 that Video,

State’s EX.

1

Part 1.mp4.”

Which

is

—

p. 42,

contained in the record in a ﬁle titled

Trooper Scheierman approached and spoke With Randall

why

explaining

that the car

passenger-side Window,

he was pulled over; requesting Randall’s driver’s license and, when informed

was a

rental, the car-rental

provided those documents. (TL,
that

at the

he was driving home t0

t0 take a vacation

agreement; and asking about his travel plans as Randall

p. 24, L.

21

—

EX.

p. 26, L. 19;

1,

Nevada

Paul, Minnesota from Las Vegas,

St.

because the ﬂight “only cost $75.”

01:31

(T12, p. 26, L.

—

03:08.) Randall said

to

23 —

which he had ﬂown
p. 27, L. 19;

EX.

1,

02:30 — 02:45, 05:50 — 06:17.) Trooper Scheierman noticed that the cost to rent the car in Las

Vegas

to drive

t0 drive

back

was ﬁve hundred

to St. Paul

dollars

back When ﬂights were so inexpensive.

and thought

it

odd

to incur that

(TL, p. 27, Ls. 6-19.)

He

expense

also noted that

Randall appeared extraordinarily nervous, With visibly shaking hands and a pulsing carotid
(TL, p. 27, L. 20

artery.

—

p. 28, L. 10.)

food wrappers, jugs of water, and

toiletries

The

car he

was driving

strewn about.

also appeared “lived in,” with

(Id.)

Trooper Scheierman asked Randall to come back t0 his patrol car While he checked
Randall’s driving status and for warrants. (Tr., p. 28, L. 14

—

1,

03:08 — 03:22.)

As he

(TL, p. 29, Ls. 2-6.)

Asked Whether

ran those checks, he continued to talk With Randall.

29, L.

p.

1;

EX.

he had travelled any further west than Las Vegas, Randall paused brieﬂy and responded, “Nah.”
(TL, p. 29, Ls. 5-18; EX.

1,

ﬁve seconds before saying
05:06 — 05:15.)

05:00 — 05:05.) Asked

sure,

Randall again paused for about

p. 29, L.

19

—

p. 30, L. 4;

EX.

1,

Trooper Scheierman noticed that Randall appeared t0 become even more

when asked

breath.

(Tr., p. 30, Ls. 5-23.)

these details about his travel, exhibiting heavier breathing and shortness of

He

further west, taking Randall the

in t0

was

he went to Reno, Nevada. (TL,

that

nervous

had ﬂown

if he

also recognized that

wrong

direction

Reno

is

seven hours from Las Vegas and

from Minnesota.

Las Vegas on “late Wednesday night” (EX.

1,

(Id.)

According

to Randall,

he

06:06 — 06:14), or Wednesday,

August
in the

The

30.

car

was rented

morning of September

the next day

in

much

Las Vegas and the trafﬁc stop was

Trooper Scheierman recognized that

(TL, p. 52, Ls. 10-17.)

3.

Randall could “not have spent

0n August 31

time in Las Vegas” and “would have been spending his

entire trip driving.” (TL, p. 30, Ls. 17-23.)

Trooper Scheierman expressed concern

engaged in drug trafﬁcking.

at this

(Tr., p. 31, Ls. 9-19;

EX

time about the possibility that Randall was

1,

06:30 — 06:52.)

He

noted that he “quite

often” sees drug trafﬁckers taking a one-way ﬂight t0 a destination, spending a short period of

time there, and renting a car to return a long distance, but does not often see average travelers

doing

so.

(EX

1,

06:30 — 06:52.) Randall denied that he was involved in drug trafﬁcking.

Trooper Scheierman then asked

around the

car.

(TL, p. 31, L. 20

if

Randall would mind

—

p. 32, L. 13;

EX.

1,

did not mind, Trooper Scheierman asked if Randall
did not mind. (TL, p. 31, L. 20 —p. 32, L. 13; EX.

1,

if

(Id.)

he ran his drug detection dog, Bingo,

06:52 — 06:58.) Randall responded that he

was

“sure,” and Randall

conﬁrmed

that

he

06:52 — 06:58.)

For safety purposes while his attention was distracted from Randall, Trooper Scheierman
asked and received permission t0 brieﬂy pat Randall
EX.

1,

06:58 — 07:25.)

the patrol car

driver’s—side

down

weapons.

(TL, p. 35, Ls. 7-17;

After frisking Randall for weapons, Trooper Scheierman

on a leash and Bingo immediately walked

Window 0f Randall’s

12; p. 74, Ls. 3-9; EX.

for

1,

car,

Which Randall had

in front

left

let

Bingo out of

of Trooper Scheierman to the

open. (TL, p. 35, L. 22

—

p. 36, L.

08:45 — 08:52.) Bingo put his paws 0n the door, sniffed, and “propelled

himself inside of that open window.”

(TL, p. 35, L. 22

—

p. 36, L. 12;

EX.

1,

08:45

—

08:52.)

Trooper Scheierman testiﬁed that as Bingo was jumping into the car he “got hung up” and
Trooper Scheierman assisted the dog to prevent him from injuring himself and to prevent damage

t0 the car.

—

(TL, p. 68, L. 6

observed Bingo

EX.

p. 69, L. 7;

1,

08:45

—

presence of narcotics near the back

alert to the

1,

9:30

—

(TL, p. 36, Ls. 13-19.)

seat.

After Bingo later alerted again on the outside 0f the car

37, L. 24; EX.

Trooper Scheierman then

08:52.)

at the

trunk (TL, p. 36, L. 20

09:45), Trooper Scheierman put Bingo back in the patrol car, read

Randall his rights, and informed him that the car would be searched (TL,
14; EX.

1,

— p.

09:45 — 11:20).

When

p. 37, L.

25 —

now on

Trooper Scheierman and another ofﬁcer

p. 38, L.

the scene

searched the car, they found four duffel bags containing approximately sixty—ﬁve pounds of

marijuana in the trunk.
Randall was arrested.

(Tr., p. 38, L.

25 —

(TL, p. 39, L. 25

—

was “not sure” how much marijuana was

p. 39, L. 24; R., pp. 15-16;

p. 40, L. 5;

EX.

1,

12:17

in the car, that this

—

was

EX.

1,

11:20 — 12:15.)

He

13:12.)

stated that

the ﬁrst time he

had been

involved in drug trafﬁcking, and that he was getting paid “7 or 8 [thousand d011ars].”
12:42

—

marijuana in excess 0f twenty—ﬁve pounds.
claiming that the

initial

was unlawful.

stop

was

(R., pp.

illegal, that

Amendment was

§

1,

37-2732B(a)(1)(C), trafﬁcking in

He

(R., pp. 47-48.)

it

violated because the stop

and because Bingo entered the car

ﬁled a motion to suppress

was unlawfully extended, and

59-61 .) After a suppression hearing

testiﬁed, the parties submitted brieﬁng.

82),

(EX.

13:12.)

Randall was charged With Violating Idaho Code

the car

he

(R., pp.

71-111.)

at

82-83).

Randall argued that the Fourth

The

for a

state

dog

With respect

instinctively following the

t0

Bingo’s entry into the

car, the state

sniff (R., pp. 78-

responded that Trooper

Scheierman had reason to suspect drug trafﬁcking and that Randall consented
pp. 94-97.)

0f

Which Trooper Scheierman

was unreasonably extended
(R., pp.

that the search

to a

dog

sniff.

(R.,

argued that Bingo was merely

odor of narcotics through a Window that Randall

left

open

(R., pp. 99-

100) and, at any rate, Bingo later alerted on the exterior of the car (R., p. 101). The district court

then issued an order denying the motion. (R., pp. 112-25.)

It

held that the

justiﬁed by Randall’s failure t0 properly signal lane changes

(R.,

initial

pp.

trafﬁc stop

115-17),

was

Trooper

Scheierman had reasonable suspicion necessary to brieﬂy extend the stop for a dog sniff (R., pp.
117-20), and Bingo’s act of jumping into the car did not transform an otherwise lawful

investigative detention into a Fourth

in

Amendment

no way associated With police misconduct

Violation because doing so

(R., pp. 120-24).

subsequently alerted on the exterior trunk 0f the car as well. (R.,

The court

was

instinctive

also held that

and

Bingo

p. 123.)

Randall then agreed to enter a conditional guilty plea to Violating Idaho Code § 372732B(a)(1)(B), trafﬁcking in marijuana of between ﬁve and twenty—ﬁve pounds, While reserving
the right to appeal the denial of his motion t0 suppress. (R., pp. 139-45; Tr., p. 85, L. 15

L. 4.)

The

district court

accepted that plea.

(TL, p. 98, L. 5

Randall was sentenced to seven years With three years ﬁxed.
appealed. (R., pp. 164-68.)

—

—

p. 87,

p. 99, L. 16; R., pp. 151-53.)

(R., pp.

160-63.)

He

timely

ISSUES
Randall states the issues on appeal

I.

Did the

II.

Did

district court err

as:

When

the district court abuse

it

denied Mr. Randall’s motion t0 suppress?

its

discretion

When

it

imposed a uniﬁed

0f seven years, With three years ﬁxed, upon Mr. Randall
following his plea 0f guilty t0 trafﬁcking in marijuana?
sentence

(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)

The

state rephrases the issues as:

1.

Has Randall

2.

Has Randall

failed to

show

failed t0

that the district court erred

show

that the district court

by denying

abused

its

his

motion

t0 suppress?

sentencing discretion by

imposing a uniﬁed sentence of seven years with three years ﬁxed?

ARGUMENT
I.

Randall Has Failed T0

A.

Show That The

District Court Erred

BV Denying His Motion T0

Suppress

Introduction

On

appeal, Randall

makes two arguments with

Amendment?

suppress, both addressed t0 the Fourth

respect t0 the denial of his motion t0

First,

he argues that Trooper Scheierman

did not have reasonable articulable suspicion 0f criminal conduct necessary to extend the trafﬁc

stop t0 conduct a

dog

sniff.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-15.) Second, he argues that the entry 0f the

drug detection dog, Bingo, into the car constituted a Fourth
brief, pp. 15-22.)

had reasonable
for a

dog

Both arguments

As

Violation.

the district court correctly found, Trooper Scheierman

pp. 117-20.)

Second, the

district court also correctly

of jumping unprompted into a window

left

addition, however,

even

if

it

“The Fourth Amendment

did,

found that Bingo’s

open by Randall involved n0 police

misconduct and does not constitute a Violation 0f the Fourth Amendment.

2

(Appellant’s

articulable suspicion necessary to justify the brief extension of the stop required

sniff. (R.,

instinctive act

fail.

Amendment

(R., pp. 120-24.)

In

Bingo’s subsequent indication on the exterior trunk of Randall’s

to the

United States Constitution and Article

Section 17 0f the

I,

Idaho Constitution protect people against unreasonable searches and seizures. The guarantees
under the United States Constitution and the Idaho Constitution are substantially the same.”
State V. Ballou, 145 Idaho 840, 845, 186 P.3d 696, 701 (Ct.
t0 suppress cited Article

I,

App. 2008). While Randall’s motion

Section 17 (R., pp. 59-61), his

Amendment
two ways)). He

memorandum

in support focused

78 (claiming that ofﬁcers violated his “Fourth

exclusively 0n the Fourth

(R., p.

Amendment

has never argued that the Idaho Constitution provides

rights” in

greater protection than does the United States Constitution in this case.

ﬂ

He

has therefore waived

State V. Vasquez, 129 Idaho 129, 131, 922 P.2d 426, 428 (Ct. App.
any such argument.
1996) (hold that though the appellant’s “suppression motion cited both the United States and

Idaho constitutions, his argument t0 the

trial

court

was based upon

the Fourth

Amendment.

.

.

.

[h]e did not at any point argue that the Idaho constitution extended greater protection than that

afforded

by the

federal constitution,”

and had therefore waived the argument).

car implies that Bingo’s entry into the car

was not

the but-for cause of the discovery 0f the

marijuana in the trunk.

Standard

B.

On

Of Review

review of a ruling 0n a motion t0 suppress, the appellate court “defers t0 the

trial

and “freely reviews the

trial

court’s ﬁndings 0f fact unless the ﬁndings are clearly erroneous,”

court’s application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.”

State V. Willoughbv, 147

Idaho 482, 485-86, 211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009). “[I]n conducting that review the appellate court
‘should take care both t0 review ﬁndings 0f historical fact only for clear error and to give due

weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement
0fﬁcers.’”

United

State V.

States,

Munoz, 149 Idaho

121, 127, 233 P.3d 52, 58 (2010) (quoting

517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)).

circumstances, not

“The review must be based upon the

upon an individual examination of each observation by

isolation.” Li. “Findings

competent evidence.

of fact are not clearly erroneous

if they are

Omelas

totality

0f the

the ofﬁcer taken in

supported by substantial and

Decisions regarding the credibility 0f Witnesses, weight t0 be given to

conﬂicting evidence, and factual inferences to be drawn are also within the discretion of the
court.” Li. at 128,

C.

The

233 P.3d

at

Court

trial

59 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Concluded That Reasonable
Supported The Brief Extension Of The Trafﬁc Stop
District

V.

Correctly

The Fourth Amendment of the United

Articulable

Suspicion

States Constitution provides that “[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches

and

seizures, shall not

be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. While routine trafﬁc stops by police

ofﬁcers implicate the Fourth

Amendment’s

prohibition against unreasonable searches and

seizures, the reasonableness

because a trafﬁc stop

Delaware

V.

is

0f a trafﬁc stop

more

is

analyzed under Ter_ry

V.

Ohio, 392 U.S.

similar t0 an investigative detention than a custodial arrest.

Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State V. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d

“[A]n investigative detention

1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003).

permissible if

is

speciﬁc articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person

t0

be engaged in criminal

392 U.S.

(1968),

1

activity.”

m,

139 Idaho

at

is,

it is

based upon

has been, or

about

is

983, 88 P.3d at 1223 (citing

Tim,

at 21).

An

must not only be justiﬁed

investigative detention

conducted in a manner that

is

which justiﬁed the interference

When

beginning, but must also be

reasonably related in scope and duration to the circumstances
Florida V. Roger, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983);

in the ﬁrst place.

State V. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181,

for determining

at its

90 P.3d 926, 931

(Ct.

App. 2004) “There

is

n0

rigid time limit

a detention has lasted longer than necessary; rather, a court

must consider

the scope of the detention and the law enforcement purposes t0 be served, as well as the duration

0f the stop.”

State V.

Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 496, 198 P.3d 128, 134

addition, “[t]he purpose 0f a stop is not permanently

for during the course 0f the detention there

that

which

initially

prompted the

stop.”

may

ﬁxed

.

.

.

at the

moment

(Ct.

App. 2008)

the stop

In

is initiated,

evolve suspicion of criminality different from

m,

139 Idaho

at

984, 88 P.3d at 1224.

ofﬁcer’s observations, general inquiries, and events succeeding the stop

may—and

often

“The

d0—

give rise t0 legitimate reasons for particular lines of inquiry and further investigation by an
ofﬁcer.”

stop,

Grantham, 146 Idaho

an ofﬁcer

who

at

496, 198 P.3d at 134.

after initiating a trafﬁc

acquires reasonable suspicion that a car contains narcotics

duration 0f the stop t0 deploy a drug-detecting dog.

42 P.3d 706, 710

For example,

(Ct.

App. 2001) (holding

m

State V.

that detention

may

extend the

Brumﬁeld, 136 Idaho 913, 917,

of roughly forty—ﬁve minutes before

drug dog arrived was permissible Where ofﬁcer
drug trafﬁcking); State

Who

initiated trafﬁc stop reasonably suspected

Keene, 144 Idaho 915, 919, 174 P.3d 885, 889

V.

(detention for ﬁfteen minutes until arrival 0f drug

dog was permissible

(Ct.

in light

App. 2007)

of reasonable

suspicion regarding the presence 0f narcotics).

“The justiﬁcation
circumstances then

known

investigative detention

may be

activity

is

afoot.”

internal quotation

for an investigative detention is evaluated

t0 the ofﬁcer.”

139 Idaho

the totality 0f the

983, 88 P.3d at 1223.

at

United States

m,

“The standard 0f ‘reasonable
State V.

An

justiﬁed if an ofﬁcer has “reasonable suspicion t0 believe that criminal

V.

Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (emphasis added,

marks omitted). “An investigatory stop does not deal With hard

with probabilities.”

t0 meet.”

m,

upon

149 Idaho

at 126,

233 P.3d

at

certainties, but

57 (internal quotation marks omitted).

articulable suspicion’ is not a particularly high 0r onerous standard

Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 410, 283 P.3d 722, 727 (2012).

“Although a mere

‘hunch’ does not create reasonable suspicion, the level 0f suspicion the standard requires

is

considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously
less than is necessary for

(internal

probable cause.”

Navarette

quotation marks and citations omitted).

V. California,

572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014)

Whether reasonable suspicion

evaluated in light of the ofﬁcer’s experience and expertise.

My,

153 Idaho

at

exists

is

410, 283 P.3d

at 727.

Less than nine minutes passed from the time Randall was pulled over until the time Bingo
alerted

on the trunk of the

much of that

rental car.

(EX.

1,

01:00 — 09:47.)

time Trooper Scheierman was pursuing the

instance, checking Randall’s driving status

initial

and for warrants.

There

is

no dispute

that during

purpose of the trafﬁc stop by, for

E

State V. Renteria, 163 Idaho

545, 549, 415 P.3d 954, 958 (Ct. App. 2018) (holding that “an ofﬁcer’s purpose during a trafﬁc

10

may

stop also

also include conducting ordinary inquiries incident to the trafﬁc stop,” including

“checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the

driver,

and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance”).

therefore only a very brief extension of the stop prior to Bingo’s alert

E

probable cause t0 search the car and detain Randall.

302 P.3d 328, 331 (2012) (holding

The

detention and search).

that alert

district court

by

car,

Which provided

State V. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 706,

trained drug

dog provides probable cause

for

found that Trooper Scheierman “has been trained and

experienced in identifying the indicators of drug trafficking” (R.,
challenge that ﬁnding on appeal.

0n the

There was

In light of that experience

p. 120),

is

and Randall does not

and expertise, the

facts

provided

Trooper Scheierman the reasonable suspicion necessary t0 justify the very short extension of the
trafﬁc stop necessary t0 conduct a

First,

dog

sniff.

though Trooper Scheierman estimated that Randall’s car was traveling

at or

below

the speed limit initially, Randall slowed his car as he approached Trooper Scheierman’s patrol

car and, as he passed Trooper Scheierman, sat in an

View.

(Tr., p. 20, L.

that that

6

—

p. 21, L. 11; p. 45, L. 11

conduct was unusual and suspicious. (TL,

awkward manner with

—

p. 46, L. 1.)

his face shielded

from

Trooper Scheierman believed

p. 21, Ls. 12-19.)

E

State V. Nevarez, 147

Idaho 470, 475-76, 210 P.3d 578, 583-84 (Ct. App. 2009) (holding that where passengers 0f car

were seated so as
traveling at or

to obscure the ofﬁcer’s

below the speed

and contributed

t0

reasonable

View and slowed upon seeing the ofﬁcer despite already

limit, these facts

m

suggested an attempt “t0 avoid police contact”

suspicion justifying brief investigatory detention);

Troughton, 126 Idaho 406, 410, 884 P.2d 419, 423 (Ct. App. 1994) (apparent attempt by
passenger

t0

shield

his

face

from View contributed

investigatory detention).

11

t0

reasonable

suspicion justifying

Second, Randall was unusually nervous for a driver in a routine trafﬁc stop, with his
carotid artery “beating profusely” and his hands shaking as he

27, L. 20

—

documents.

(T12, p.

nervousness

accompanying a trafﬁc stop

p.

28, L.

handed Trooper Scheierman

While Randall

10.)

is

correct that the typical

of “‘limited signiﬁcance” for purposes 0f

is

establishing reasonable suspicion precisely because

it

is

typical (Appellant’s brief, pp.

13-14

(quoting State V. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 285-86, 108 P.3d 424, 432-33 (Ct. App. 2005)),

excessive nervousness that

suspicion,

ﬂ

is

atypical for a trafﬁc stop does contribute t0 a

ﬁnding of reasonable

Chapman, 146 Idaho 346, 352, 194 P.3d 550, 556

State V.

(Ct.

App. 2008)

(nervousness and “shaking” contributed t0 probable cause t0 arrest and search for drugs); State V.

Johnson,

137 Idaho 656, 660, 51

P.3d

1112,

1116

(Ct.

App. 2002)

nervousness” as factor justifying detention); Grantham, 146 Idaho

at

(citing

“excessive

497, 198 P.3d

at

135

(same); United States V. Koshnevis, 979 F.2d 691, 695 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that out-of-the-

ordinary nervousness, including shaking hands, contributed t0 probable cause for search 0f car).
In addition to visibly shaking, Randall’s

With shortness of breath,

Grantham, 146 Idaho

When he was

at

497,

demeanor changed, and he appeared even more nervous,

questioned regarding his travel.

198 P.3d

at

(T12, p. 30, Ls. 5-23.)

135 (holding that Where defendant’s demeanor

“changed visibly when asked whether there was methamphetamine in the
contributed t0 reasonable suspicion).

E

According

t0

car,”

that

fact

Trooper Scheierman, the prolonged and

increasing indications 0f extreme nervousness were unusual for a normal trafﬁc stop. (TL, p. 71,

L. 8

— p.

72, L. 2.)

Third, Randall’s car appeared “lived-in,” with “food wrappers, gallon jugs of water, [and]

toiletries

strewn across the vehicle loose.” (TL,

this is consistent

p. 28, Ls. 2-5.)

Trooper Scheierman testiﬁed that

with criminal activity involving long, continuous road

12

trips

(TL, p. 28, Ls. 5-

10),

such as drug trafﬁcking. Though not every car that looks “lived-in”

trafﬁcking,

it is

is

associated With drug

nevertheless a factor contributing to reasonable suspicion in the totality of the

circumstances, particularly in light of Trooper Scheierman’s experience and expertise.

United States

V.

E

Lebrun, 261 F.3d 731, 733 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that disheveled appearance

0f car, while consistent with innocent

travel, contributed to

reasonable suspicion in the totality of

the circumstances and in light of ofﬁcer’s expertise and experience); United States V. Contreras,

506 F.3d 1031, 1036 (10th

Cir.

2007) (same).

Fourth, Randall’s responses to questions regarding his travel plans were hesitant and

Asked about

inconsistent.

home

(TL, p. 26, L. 23

in Minnesota.

he was driving from Las Vegas t0 his

his origin, Randall said that

—

Asked Whether he had

p. 27, L. 5.)

travelled any further

west than Las Vegas, Randall paused brieﬂy and then responded, “Nah.” (TL,
EX.

1,

p. 29, Ls. 7-18;

05:00 — 05:05.) Because of Randall’s strange hesitancy and indecisiveness in responding

t0 a simple question,

for approximately

p. 29, L.

19

—

Trooper Scheierman asked

is

was

ﬁve seconds and eventually respond

p. 30, L. 4;

regarding travel

if he

EX.

1,

“sure,” causing Randall t0 pause again

that

he had driven t0 Reno, Nevada. (TL,

05:06 — 05:15.) Conﬁlsed 0r inconsistent answers t0 questions

a factor supporting reasonable suspicion.

m

State V. Kelley, 159 Idaho 417,

425, 361 P.3d 1280, 1288 (Ct. App. 2015) (pointing to hesitant answers to basic questions
regarding travel as contributing t0 reasonable suspicion); United States V. Gonzalez, 328 F.3d
755, 758 (5th Cir. 2003) (same); United States V. Kopp, 45 F.3d 1450, 1454 (10th Cir. 1995)

(same).

In addition, Trooper Scheierman

for drug trafﬁcking,

18-21.)

Such

and

that

Minnesota

was aware

is

that

Reno

is

a “source area for contraband”

a destination. (TL, p. 60, L. 18

travel contributes t0 reasonable suspicion.

13

E

— p.

61, L. 7; p. 72, Ls.

Danney, 153 Idaho

at

41

1,

283 P.3d

at

728 (holding

that travel

States V. Forero-Rincon,

RaLirez, No.

from known source

city contributes t0 reasonable suspicion);

626 F.2d 218, 223 (2d

CR 00-1066 LH,

2000

Cir.

1980) (same); United States

V.

United

Beiarano-

WL 36739625, at *3-4 (D.N.M. Dec. 7, 2000) (same), m,

35 F. App’x 740 (10th Cir. 2002).
Next, even setting aside that Reno

travel

was

suspicious.

He

is

claimed that he had

and did so because ﬂights “only cost $75.”
02:45.)

He

got in late “Wednesday” (EX.

1,

a source city for trafﬁcking, Randall’s reported

ﬂown from Minnesota t0
(TL, p. 26, L. 23

—

approximately seven hours from Las Vegas.

(TL, p. 29, L. 19

t0 Pocatello is at least another eight hours.

way back t0

St.

Paul, Minnesota in his rental car

— p.

02:30 —

(Tr., p. 51, L.

When he was

—

p. 30, L. 23.)

12

—

p. 52, L. 4.)

The

drive from

He was 0n

ﬂew

to

p. 24, Ls. 17-20; p.

Las Vegas for a vacation speciﬁcally because ﬂights

Vegas, he paid ﬁve hundred dollars for a rental car t0 drive back.3
arrival in

t0

With

Las Vegas and the date he was pulled over, he spent

driving, in part in the opposite direction

According

his

pulled over 0n Sunday, September

were cheap, but instead 0f purchasing a cheap return ﬂight home and staying longer

between his

is

27, L. 5; p. 52, Ls. 14-17.)

So, according to Randall, he

3

1,

(T12, p. 27, Ls. 9-17; p. 52, Ls.

around 8:30 a.m., just inside of Bannock County on Highway 86. (TL,

26, L. 23

there

19; EX.

Before being pulled over near Pocatello, he had Visited Reno, Nevada, Which

10-17).

3, at

p. 27, L.

05:50 — 06:17) or August 30, and then rented a car in

Las Vegas the next day, 0n August 31, for ﬁve-hundred dollars

Reno

Las Vegas for a vacation

from

St.

in

Las

the three full days

at least

ﬁfteen hours

Paul and to a city that Trooper Scheierman

Google Maps, the approximate drive time from Las Vegas t0 St. Paul, Minnesota
is twenty—three hours and forty minutes.

along the fastest route, which Randall did not take,
https://google.com/maps.

14

E

recognized as a source for drug trafﬁckers.
hours of driving before he reached

St.

Pau1.4

When

he was pulled over, he had another eighteen

As Trooper Scheierman

told Randall at the time of

the stop, his travel—ﬂying t0 a city, spending a very short period of time there, renting a car in

order t0 drive a very long distance back, and driving from a city

trafﬁcking—was

typical 0f drug trafﬁckers

known

and unusual for ordinary

as a source for drug

travelers.

06:50.) This sort of unusual travel contributes t0 reasonable suspicion.

E

(EX.

Ke_lley,

1,

06:30 —

159 Idaho

at

425, 361 P.3d at 1288 (holding that “confusing and suspicious” travel plans, involving a “quick

back and
t0

forth trip, with

little

luggage, in a third-party—owned vehicle from the Lake Tahoe area

Jackson Hole, Wyoming, Via central Oregon, which was not the most direct route,”

contributed t0 reasonable suspicion); Contreras, 506 F.3d at 1036 (holding that travel plans that

were “suspicious

at best,”

involving a very long trip with a quick turn-around, contributed to

reasonable suspicion).

While insufﬁcient

individually, these facts collectively raise a reasonable suspicion 0f

drug trafﬁcking, particularly in light of Trooper Scheierman’s experience and expertise.
Contreras, 506 F.3d at 1036 (holding that where driver

was

extraordinarily nervous, with shaking

hands, and her travel plans were “suspicious at best,” involving a very long
turn-around, using a rental car, which

was

littered

trip

with a quick

with food wrappers, ofﬁcer had reasonable

suspicion for investigative detention in light of a set 0f facts that “begins t0 strongly resemble

that

of a narcotics courier”).

Again,

it is

important t0 note that reasonable suspicion “is not a

particularly high 0r onerous standard t0 meet,”

requires “considerably less than proof 0f

4

Draw,

153 Idaho

at

410, 283 P.3d

at

727, and

wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and

Google Maps, the approximate drive time from Pocatello to St. Paul, Minnesota
along the fastest route, is eighteen hours and thirty—three minutes.
https://google.com/maps.
According

t0

E

15

obviously less than

is

necessary for probable cause.”

quotation marks omitted).

investigative detentions

Tag

In

V.

Navarette, 572 U.S. at 397 (internal

Ohio, 392 U.S.

1

(1968), the case out of which

and the reasonable suspicion standard were born, the

reasonable suspicion were three

men talking,

and repeatedly walking past and looking

standing on a corner for an extended period of time,

into a store

window.

was

surely amenable t0 innocent explanation, the ofﬁcer

investigate the possibility that they

amenable

here, while the facts are

facts that generated

were “casing” the

While those

Li. at 6.

facts

entitled to brieﬂy detain the

store for a robbery.

to innocent explanation

and d0 not

Li. at 28.

entail that

were

men

t0

Likewise

Randall was

trafﬁcking in drugs, the totality of the circumstances justiﬁed Trooper Scheierman in brieﬂy

detaining

Randall—a detention

that lasted

minutes

at

best—to investigate

his suspicion that

Randall’s car contained narcotics.
Randall’s argument to the contrary focuses heavily on State V. Kelley, 160 Idaho 761, 379

P.3d 351

(Ct.

App. 2016),

in

Which the Court 0f Appeals determined

that

reasonable suspicion justifying the extension of a trafﬁc stop for a dog

pp. 12-13.)

Ke_lley,

While

Ke_lley does bear

though the court’s discussion

for example, nervous

and had unusual

facts t0 criminal conduct.

court

was

Li. at 764,

implicitly requiring in the

certainly stated

why,

was aware, Which

He

some

in light

is

similarities t0 this case,

quite brief,

it

emphasized

travel plans, there

379 P.3d

at 354.

way 0f “objective

it

an ofﬁcer did not have

sniff.

does not control

facts”

it is

was

and “linking,” Trooper Scheierman

0f his experience and expertise, he believed the

travelling

from Reno

destination, respectively, for drug trafﬁcking.

He

16

facts linking” those

not entirely clear What the

certainly appear objective, suggested criminal conduct

stated that Randall

this case. In

that While the defendant was,

were n0 “objective

Though

(Appellant’s brief,

to St. Paul

facts about

which he

and drug trafﬁcking.

and those were an origin and

noted that Randall became even more nervous

When he was

questioned regarding this travel, and that he

travelled to Reno.

He

stated that Randall’s travel—involving a

rental car to return a long distance after a very short

ordinary travelers.

involving long

He

noted that the

trips, like

state

drug trafﬁcking.

hide that he had

initially tried to

stay—was

one-way ﬂight and the use 0f a

typical

of drug trafﬁckers and not

0f Randall’s car was indicative 0f criminal conduct
In light 0f those facts, other facts

—like Randall’s

apparent attempt t0 avoid contact with police and his extraordinary nervousness—take 0n
additional signiﬁcance in the totality of the circumstances.

The

district court correctly

found that the

0f the circumstances, considered in

totality

0f Trooper Scheierman’s experience and expertise, justiﬁed the very brief detention

light

at issue in

this case.

D.

The District Court Correctly Determined That Bingo’s Entry Into The Car Did Not
The Suppression Of Evidence
Warrantless searches are “per se unreasonable under the Fourth

Amendment—subject

only to a few speciﬁcally established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz
U.S. 347, 357 (1967).

One such

exception t0 the warrant requirement

exception,” Which allows warrantless searches 0f cars

that the car contains contraband or evidence

U.S. 565, 572 (1991); State

may

V.

0f criminal

there

activity.

is

E

V.

United

is

States,

389

the “automobile

probable cause to believe
California

V.

Acevedo, 500

Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 842, 979 P.2d 1199, 1200 (1999). Ofﬁcers

deploy a drug dog on the exterior 0f a lawfully stopped car Without a warrant 0r probable

cause to believe that

it

contains narcotics.

Illinois V. Caballes,

State V. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 363, 17 P.3d 301,

alert

When

Justify

on the exterior of a vehicle

is

sufﬁcient, in

17

307

and of

(Ct.

543 U.S. 405, 409-10 (2005);

App. 2000). “A reliable drug dog’s

itself,

t0 establish probable cause for a

warrantless search 0f the interior.”

State V. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 706,

302 P.3d 328, 331

(2012).

Randall argues that his motion t0 suppress should have been granted because Bingo did
not merely sniff the exterior 0f his

for

two reasons.

First,

even

car,

if there

but entered

it

Without his permission. That argument

was a Fourth Amendment

Violation,

cause of the discovery of the evidence Randall seeks t0 suppress.

Amendment
instinctively

it

was not

the but—for

Second, there was n0 Fourth

search because, as the district court found, Bingo entered the open car

and not as the

result

Window

0f any misconduct by Trooper Scheierman.

Bingo’s Entry Into The Car

1.

fails

Was Not The But—For Cause Of The Discovery Of The

Evidence Randall Seeks To Suppress
“[E]Vidence Will not be excluded as

of the discovery 0f the evidence. Suppression

some sense

unless the illegality

fruit

is

is at least

the but-for cause

not justiﬁed unless the challenged evidence

the product of illegal governmental activity.” Segura

815 (1984) (internal quotations marks omitted).

“Where

V.

United

States,

a defendant has

is

in

468 U.S. 796,

moved

to suppress

evidence allegedly gained through unconstitutional police conduct, the State bears the ultimate

burden of persuasion to prove that the challenged evidence
an

initial

burden of showing a factual nexus between the

the evidence.”

State V. Dahl, 162 Idaho 541, 546,

is

untainted, but the defendant bears

illegality

and the

400 P.3d 629, 634

requires a prima facie showing that the evidence sought t0 be suppressed

light but for the

government’s unconstitutional conduct.”

Li.

18

(Ct.

would not have come

was a product or

of

“This

App. 2017).

The defendant must “show

the events that did take place, the discovery of the evidence

unlawful police conduct.” Li

State’s acquisition

that,

result

to

on

of the

Trooper Scheierman searched the car and discovered the roughly sixty—ﬁve pounds 0f
marijuana in the trunk only after Bingo alerted on the exterior of the trunk.
38, L. 14; EX.

1,

09:31

—

11:50.)

That

alert

(Tr.,

p 36,

L.

20 —

p.

provided Trooper Scheierman probable cause t0

search the car. Randall has never argued or suggested otherwise, focusing instead 0n the fact that

Bingo had previously entered the car without

his permission.

But whether Bingo did

Whether Bingo doing so constituted a Fourth Amendment search,

is

and

ultimately irrelevant t0 his

suppression motion in light of Bingo’s subsequent alert on the exterior 0f the car.

that alert,

so,

Because 0f

Trooper Scheierman had probable cause to search the car that was entirely independent

0f Bingo’s

entry.

Bingo’s entry into the car was therefore not the but-for cause 0f the discovery

of the marijuana.

Though involving

different facts, the Court

142 Idaho 180, 125 P.3d 536

(Ct.

App. 2005),

is

0f Appeals’ opinion in State
nevertheless instructive.

V.

Wigginton,

In Wigginton, an

ofﬁcer pulled a car over for a trafﬁc Violation, observed indications that Wigginton was
intoxicated,

and smelled alcohol

Wigginton passed ﬁeld-sobriety

tests, the

car due t0 the odor 0f alcohol.

Li

arrived.

Li.

Li

in the car.

at

181-82,

125 P.3d

at

537-38.

Though

ofﬁcer informed him that he was going t0 search the

In the meantime, another ofﬁcer With a drug-detecting

That ofﬁcer walked his dog around the car and the dog

alerted.

Li.

dog

The ofﬁcers

searched the car, recovering ingredients and equipment used to manufacture methamphetamine.

Li.

Wigginton moved

stop

was unlawfully extended by

Wigginton had
sniff

t0 suppress the evidence

the

dog

sniff.

failed t0 establish the “factual

and the discovery 0f the evidence

search of the car

found in his car on the grounds that the trafﬁc
Li.

The Court of Appeals concluded

nexus” between any

in the car.

Li. at 184,

125 P.3d

was independently justiﬁed by the odor 0f alcohol
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illegality involving the

at 540.

It

that

dog

held that the

and, as a result, any illegality

associated With the dog sniff “only brieﬂy delayed an already justiﬁed search, and

said that the challenged evidence

Li.

would not have come

t0 light if that delay

Because the search 0f the car was justiﬁed by probable cause With respect

no claim of associated

illegality, the

alleged illegality

was not

it

cannot be

had not occurred.”
t0

Which there was

the but-for cause 0f the discovery

0f the evidence.
Likewise, here, Trooper Scheierman had probable cause t0 search based 0n Bingo’s alert

on the

exterior trunk 0f Randall’s car.

Setting aside the claim that Trooper Scheierman did not

have the reasonable suspicion necessary

to extend the stop, there is

associated With that alert and Randall has never argued that

search the car. Just as there

have occurred
540, there

jumped

dog

sniff

jumped

sniff had not

no evidence here

is

ﬁrst

dog

if the

was n0 evidence

into the car.

The evidence

Nor

into the car.

is

of the car would not
at 184,

the contrary. Trooper Scheierman

is t0

He would

125 P.3d

if Bingo

at

had not

was conducting a

not have abandoned that task if Bingo had not

had not ﬁrst jumped

Bingo would not have alerted 0n the

into the car.

There

is

simply no causal

between the probable cause Trooper Scheierman acquired when Bingo alerted on the

exterior of the car,

which permitted him

t0

conduct the search resulting in the discovery of the

marijuana, and Bingo’s prior act ofjumping into the car.

N0. 8:09CR92, 2010
violated the Fourth

the Violation

later alerted

that the search

of the car would not have occurred

there any reason to think that

exterior trunk of the car if he

relationship

car.

Wigginton

illegality

did not provide probable cause t0

been conducted, Wigginton, 142 Idaho

that the search

on the exterior of the

in

it

no claim 0f

WL

at

*3-4 (D. Neb. Apr.

Amendment by opening

was not a
0n the

1440418,

m
8,

United States

V.

Gastelo-Armenta,

2010) (holding that though ofﬁcer

defendant’s car door so narcotics dog could enter,

but-for cause of the discovery 0f drugs located in the car because the

dog

486 F.3d 367, 373-74 (8th

Cir.

exterior of the car); United States V. Lyons,
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2007) (holding that Where dog’s other indications on the exterior 0f the car provided probable
cause to search

Even

show

that

it

if

it,

dog’s entry into the car did not require suppression of evidence found therein).

Bingo’s entry to the car constituted a Fourth

was

Amendment

search, Randall cannot

The

district court therefore

the but—for cause of the discovery 0f the marijuana.

properly denied his motion to suppress.

Bingo’s Entry Into The Car Did Not Constitute

2.

The

Amendment

district court

concluded that Bingo’s entry into the car did not constitute a Fourth

search because

0f police misconduct.

A Fourth Amendment Search

it

was

instinctual

and not instigated by police or otherwise the

result

(R., pp. 122-24.)

upon the testimony and the evidence presented, Trooper
Scheierman’s drug dog made independent entry into the Defendant’s car because
the dog detected an odor emanating from the vehicle. While Trooper Scheierman
testiﬁed that he did assist the dog’s entry into the vehicle, that assistance was only
given to prevent injury to the animal and car and came only after the dog had
independently placed its paws on the open front driver’s side window and jumped
Based

inside.

Trooper Scheierman did nothing t0

Further, there

is

initiate the

dog’s entry into the vehicle.

nothing t0 indicate the detention lasted longer than necessary t0

satisfy the conditions

of the investigative seizure. Therefore, because Trooper

Scheierman conducted a lawful stop 0f the Defendant’s vehicle, and his

reliable

drug-detection dog instinctively and Without police misconduct indicated the

presence 0f controlled substances inside that vehicle, there was no Violation 0f the

Fourth Amendment.
(R., pp. 123-24.)

In reaching that conclusion, the district court relied

Idaho 258, 359 P.3d 1055 (Ct. App. 2016).

(R., p.

122

n. 62.)

on

State V. Naranjo, 159

In that case, ofﬁcers initiated a

trafﬁc stop and, during a sniff of the exterior of the car, a drug-detecting

moved

his

head up and into the open window of the car and alerted

Naranjo, 159 Idaho at 259-260, 359 P.3d

the

Window

in the course

Amendment was

violated

at

t0 the presence

of narcotics.

1056-1057. Naranjo, and not the ofﬁcers, had opened

0f the trafﬁc stop and

when

dog spontaneously

left it

open.

Li Naranjo argued

the dog’s head entered the car.
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Li.

that the Fourth

The Idaho Court of Appeals

held that the dog’s intrusion through the

Window

did not constitute a Fourth

Amendment

search

because the dog instinctively followed an odor into Naranjo’s car without any police misconduct,

and

having been prompted 0r instructed by ofﬁcers t0 enter the

in particular Without

259-261, 359 P.3d
instinctive actions

According

1056-1058.

at

State V.

similar t0

of trained drug dogs do not expand the scope of an otherwise legal dog sniff to

Cox, Docket N0. 46219 (Idaho App., Jan.

Mg,

driver’s—side

Li. at

“absent police misconduct, the

to the court,

an impermissible search Without a warrant 0r probable cause.”

alﬂ

car.

that

16,

Li. at 260,

359 P.3d

at

1057.

E

2020) (holding, under facts very

no Fourth Amendment search occurred where ofﬁcer knocked on

Window, the driver opened the car door

in response,

and a drug-detecting dog

later

sniffed the interior 0f the car through the still-open door during a sniff of the car’s exterior).5

On

appeal, Randall appears t0

the entry of a drug-detecting

the

dog

on

acts

instinct

dog

and there

make two arguments.

First,

into a car constitutes a Fourth

is

he argues for a per se rule that

Amendment

search, even

n0 misconduct on the part of ofﬁcers. (Appellant’s
ﬁnding

Second, he argues that the

instinct,

Without any misconduct 0n the part 0f Trooper Scheierman,

that

brief, pp.

Bingo entered the car on

15-17.)

district court’s factual

Where

is

clearly erroneous.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 17-22.)

Randall’s ﬁrst argument has already been squarely rejected

mp,

as well as the

many

federal cases

on Which

it

relied,

and

by

is

the Court 0f Appeals in

unsupported by any 0f the

cases he cites. Both the district court in this case (R., p. 122 ns. 32-65), and the Court

in

m,

that

159 Idaho

have—like the

at

260-261, 359 P.3d

at

district court in this case

1057-1058, cited numerous federal appellate cases

and the Court 0f Appeals

drug dog’s entry into a car does not constitute a Fourth

5

While

Q

is

a published opinion,

it is

oprpeals

non-ﬁnal.
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Amendment

in

mp—held that a

search if the dog acted

instinctively

Cir.

2010) (ﬁnding no Fourth

Amendment

dog

instinctively entered a car

door that was

leave the car); United States

Amendment

E

and without police misconduct.

search

when

V.

United States

Fourth Amendment search

622 F.3d 209, 214 (3rd

left

open by the defendant

by

after ofﬁcers

police, the

asked him t0

Sharp, 689 F.3d 616, 620 (6th Cir. 2012) (ﬁnding no Fourth

jumped through an open window because “absent

a dog

United States

Pierce,

search when, without encouragement

misconduct, the instinctive acts of trained canines
(citation omitted»;

V.

V.

.

.

.

do[] not Violate the Fourth

police

Amendment”

Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 362-364 (10th Cir. 1989) (ﬁnding

when dog jumped

in

hatchback that was not opened for the purpose of

permitting dog t0 enter, and police did not otherwise encourage entry); United States

Hutchinson, 471 F.Supp.2d 497, 5 10-5 11 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (ﬁnding n0 Fourth

where a drug dog

instinctively entered car

window

that suspect

With the plain smell/plain View doctrines); United States

Kan. 2008) (citing
Felders ex

contrast,

rel.

When

m

Smedlev

a drug-detecting dog enters a car because

Cir.

Amendment

is

Woods, 2008

Malcom, 755 F.3d 870, 880 (10th

ofﬁcers, 0r through misconduct serving

the Fourth

V.

violated.

E

n0 purpose but
United States

V.

it

Amendment

V.

search

had opened, equating the scenario

and ﬁnding no Fourth Amendment search

V.

n0

Cir.

WL

11396770 *5 (D.

in similar circumstances);

2014) (collecting cases).

was provoked or prompted

to facilitate a sniff

By

t0

do so by

of the car’s

interior,

Winningham, 140 F.3d 1328, 1331 (10th

1998) (holding that dog’s entry into van constituted a search because the ofﬁcers opened a

door, left

it

open, and there was n0 reason t0 d0 so but t0 facilitate the dog’s entry); GaLelo-

Armenta, 2010

WL 1440451

at

*21-23 (ﬁnding Fourth

Amendment

search where ofﬁcer opened

car doors, ordered occupants out, shut one car door but left another open, and

ofﬁcer instructed dog t0 enter car through open door).
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The per

se

rule

Where canine
advocated by

Randall—that any unauthorized entry 0f a drug-detecting dog constitutes a Fourth Amendment
search—is foreclosed both by federal and Idaho case law.

Nor
Jardines,

is

any such rule supported by the cases he

569 U.S.

1

(2013), and United States

Amendment

that there is a Fourth

m,

relies primarily

400 (2012),

search where police gather information

the Court held that

an electronic tracking device on

Amendment

He

Jones, 565 U.S.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 16-17.)

constituting a trespass.

those cases. In

V.

cites.

t0

it

But Naranjo

is

on Florida

V.

for the proposition

by means 0f conduct

perfectly consistent with

Where ofﬁcers trespassed 0n an automobile by placing
gather information, doing so constituted a Fourth

search requiring probable cause.

Where an ofﬁcer takes “a trained police dog

Li. at

404-05.

to explore the area

In Jardines, the Court held that

around the

home

[onto the front

porch] in hopes of discovering incriminating evidence,” that act involves a trespass and a Fourth

Amendment

search.

In both cases, ofﬁcers trespassed for the purpose of gathering

Li. at 9-10.

information. But where a drug dog instinctively—without facilitation, prompting, 0r provocation

from ofﬁcers—enters a

car,

it

is

simply not true that oﬁcers trespassed for the purpose of

gathering information. Naranjo and the

that a

many federal

cases on which

it

relied correctly recognize

drug dog’s instinctive and unprovoked behavior cannot be attributed to law enforcement

and does not constitute a trespass by ofﬁcers, much
information.

ﬂ, gg, State

argument that

m

and

a car constitutes a Fourth

its

V.

Miller,

less a trespass for the

purpose of gathering

766 S.E.2d 289, 296 (N.C. 2014) (addressing and rejecting

emphasis 0n trespass suggests that a drug dog’s instinctive entry into

Amendment

search).

Randall’s second argument focuses on the district court’s factual ﬁndings regarding the
nature of Bingo’s entry into the

nothing to

initiate the

car.

The

district court

found that Trooper Scheierman “did

dog’s entry into the vehicle” and that “the drug dog

24

made independent

entry into the Defendant’s car because the dog detected an odor emanating from the vehicle.”

123-24.) Randall argues that these factual ﬁndings are clearly erroneous and Bingo

(R., pp.

entered the car only as a result of misconduct 0n the part of Trooper Scheierman.

(Appellant’s

brief, pp. 17-21.)

According to Randall, Trooper Scheierman somehow prompted or provoked,
anticipated, Bingo’s

jump

into the car.

He

claims that

“it is clear in

or, at least

the trooper’s dash-camera

Video that Trooper Scheierman walked the dog directly over to the open driver’s side Window,”

and

from his position

“[i]t is clear

Window, which

it

did,

Window.” (Appellant’s

that

he anticipated the dog would enter through the open

because he positioned the dog directly in front of the driver’s side

But the evidence

brief, p. 19.)

is

exactly to the contrary.

As

the district

court found and as Trooper Scheierman testiﬁed, Bingo led Trooper Scheierman to the driver’s-

side

Window

L. 12.)

left

open by Randall, not the other way around.

The dash-cam Video

clearly

(R., p. 123; Tr., p. 35, L.

shows Bingo leading Trooper Scheierman, walking

0f Trooper Scheierman and directly to the driver’s—side window 0f the
very

little

hesitation.

testimony support the

(EX.

08:45

1,

Randall also argues that the

into the car, so long as

making

The

is

As an

car,

p. 36,

in front

and jumping in with

Both the Video and Trooper Scheierman’s

ﬁnding and there

is

n0 contravening evidence.

ﬁnding

that

Bingo entered the car

not supported by substantial and competent evidence.

initial matter, it

does not

much

matter

Why Bingo jumped

he was not prompted 0r provoked to d0 so by Trooper Scheierman.

for instance, the Court

here.

08:51.)

district court’s factual

because he was following an odor

mp,

—

district court’s factual

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 21-22.)

22 —

district court

In

of Appeals rejected an argument similar to the one Randall

found that the drug dog in that case was “‘acting by

leading itself t0 the odor source.”

Naranjo, 159 Idaho
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at

instinct

is

and

260, 359 P.3d at 1057 (quoting the

district court)

(emphasis in original). Naranjo argued that

indicated on the presence of narcotics prior t0 placing

Appeals

rej ected

the

View

that “a

facilitated

by

its

head in the

What

police.

is

relevant

Li. at

is

260-61, 359 P.3d

But, contrary to Randall’s suggestion, there

district court

window, Bingo “paused brieﬂy
after

narcotics.

(Tn, p. 35, L. 22

some

is

—

other reason,

it

was

as he

constitutionally

initial

jump

is

simply no

into the car.

and competent evidence

testiﬁed that

Trooper

0n the source 0f the

When Bingo was

at the

was snifﬁng, and then propelled himself inside of that open

p. 36, L. 19.)

into the

Though

back

it is

seat

and indicated the presence of

possible that Bingo entered the car for

surely reasonable for the district court to conclude that a drug

was following

trained t0 follow the scent 0f narcotics

the

is

The Court of

1057-58. There

also substantial

He

p. 35, L. 6.)

Which he immediately went

—

is

at

trained t0 track and indicate passively

(TL, p. 34, L. 11

Window,”

Li.

reasonably concluded that Bingo was following an odor.

Scheierman testiﬁed that Bingo
odor 0f narcotics.

car.

dog had not

Whether the dog’s entry was instinctual 0r

evidence to suggest that Trooper Scheierman prompted Bingo’s

from which the

error because the

drug dog’s behavior before entering a vehicle

significant,” concluding instead that

was encouraged or

was

this

open Window, immediately jumped

the scent of narcotics

into the car Without

When he

dog

sniffed at

any command or prompting from

Trooper Scheierman, and then alerted to narcotics.
Next, Randall claims that even

been provoked 0r prompted

to

if

Bingo

instinctively

jumped

into the car Without

having

d0 so by Trooper Scheierman, “When the dog only jumped

halfway up, [Trooper Scheierman] boosted the dog in through the window” and “[t]he dog
probably would not have made the jump Without the boost from Trooper Scheierman.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 19.)
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Trooper Scheierman testiﬁed that when Bingo jumped into the window, he was about

halfway in and got “hung up,”

damage

to the car.

at

which point he

(Tn, p. 68, L. 10

had already made entry

t0 the car,

— p.

assisted

69, L. 7.)

Bingo

When Trooper

though not completely

As

so.

dog and

to avoid injury t0 the

Scheierman intervened, Bingo

the district court found, Trooper

Scheierman’s “assistance was only given to prevent injury t0 the animal and car and came only
after the

jumped
the car

dog had independently placed

inside.”

its

paws 0n

The Video of the

(R., p. 123.)

when Trooper Scheierman pushed him

was not going

importantly, Trooper Scheierman

Bingo

all

of the

way into

was

stop reﬂects that

the rest 0f the

Contrary to Randall’s suggestion, there
evidence, to suggest that Bingo

the open front driver’s side

is

t0

way in.

(EX.

make

it all

in a difﬁcult position

of the

and had

way

him out backwards

or let

As

Randall also suggests that the

is

n0 other

into the car.6

More

option but to assist

him

try t0

own

initiative

halfway into the

complete entry into the car without assistance.

the Video reﬂects,

Bingo

is

a large dog and

At

was

at least

that point, pulling

ﬁnding—that “‘Trooper Scheierman did nothing
vehicle”’—Was erroneous in light of the Video and Trooper

district court’s

t0 initiate the dog’s entry into the

clear misreading of the

08:46 — 08:5 1 .)

little

halfway through the Window When Trooper Scheierman assisted him.

Scheierman’s testimony.

halfway in

the car at that point. Randall apparently thinks that Trooper Scheierman

Neither was a realistic option.

6

1,

at least

nothing in that Video, and there

should have done one 0f two things after Bingo jumped on his
car: pull

Bingo was

Window and

(Appellant’s brief, p. 19 (quoting R., p. 124).)
district court.

That claim involves a

Just prior to that sentence, the district court explicitly

Bingo jumped and was halfway in the car, Trooper Scheierman assisted Bingo
In the sentence
into the car to avoid injury t0 Bingo and damage to the car.
(R., p. 123.)
identiﬁed by Randall as allegedly erroneous, the district court was not denying What it had just
acknowledged, but was ﬁnding that Trooper Scheierman did nothing t0 initiate Bingo’s entry
into the car—that is, that Bingo jumped into the car without any prompting, encouragement, 0r
provocation from Trooper Scheierman and Bingo was halfway in before Trooper Scheierman
intervened to prevent injury t0 the dog. There is nothing in the record t0 suggest that that ﬁnding
found

is

that, after

erroneous,

much

less clearly erroneous.
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Bingo out of the car backwards would have guaranteed

Bingo would

that

fall

land awkwardly, risking injury t0 both Trooper Scheierman and the dog.

letting

Bingo ﬁnish

his attempt t0 follow the scent Without assistance,

with Bingo completely in the

car,

again risking injury.

the rest 0f the

It

car, as in fact

would

way through

also

the

out backwards and

The second

would

either

have ended

occurred, or with Bingo falling backwards out 0f the

have risked damage

Window.

was

It

t0 the car as

Bingo

tried to

scramble

therefore perfectly reasonable under the

circumstances for Trooper Scheierman t0 react as he did, and the circumstances that
reasonable had nothing t0 do with facilitating a sniff of the car’s

There

is

He

misconduct.

did not open the driver’s-side

jumped

into the

window, halfway

or encouragement from Trooper Scheierman.

(Tn, p. 35, L.

was engaged

Window through which Bingo gained

22 —

p. 36, L. 12)

conclusion and there

is

window

open.

and the dash-cam Video (EX.

1,

it

any

in

entry to the

(Tn, p. 74, Ls. 3-9.)

into the car, Without

(R., pp. 123-24.)

made

interior.

thus n0 objective reason to believe that Trooper Scheierman

car and did not instruct Randall to leave the

instinctively

option,

Bingo

instruction, provocation,

Trooper Scheierman’s testimony
08:45 — 08:51) both support that

n0 contrary evidence. He assisted Bingo the

rest

of the

way

into the car

only after Bingo was already halfway into the car and doing so was an objectively reasonable

means ofpreventing
L. 10

—

p. 69, L. 7.)

to Bingo’s

injury to his

Under

dog and

to the car.

(EX.

1,

08:46 — 08:51; R.,

p. 123;

Tn, p. 68,

the unique circumstances of this case, Trooper Scheierman’s response

unprovoked, instinctive jump into the Window was objectively reasonable as a means

0f preventing injury to the dog and the car and did not constitute misconduct that transformed
that entry into a Fourth

Amendment

search.
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II.

Randall Has Not

Shown That The

District

Court Abused

Its

Sentencing Discretion

Randall argues that his sentence 0f seven years With three years ﬁxed

he acknowledges that

it is

the defendant’s entire sentence.

presumed

conﬁnement.

Where

Li.

demonstrating that
614, 615 (2001).

is

reviewed under an abuse 0f discretion standard considering

State V. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007).

ﬁxed portion 0f

that the

a sentence

is

the sentence will be the defendant’s probable term of

within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of

a clear abuse 0f discretion.

it is

State V. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d

In evaluating whether a lower court abused

conducts a four-part inquiry into Whether the

of discretion;

(2) acted Within the outer

trial court:

boundaries 0f

its

discretion, the appellate court

“(1) correctly perceived the issue as

its

one

discretion; (3) acted consistently with

the legal standards applicable to the speciﬁc choices available t0

by the

excessive, though

within statutory limits. (Appellant’s brief, p. 23.)

The length of a sentence

It is

is

it;

and

(4)

reached

its

decision

exercise ofreason.” State V. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 272, 429 P.3d 149, 160 (2018).

Randall cannot challenge the three-year, ﬁxed portion of his sentence.

He

pled guilty t0

one count of trafﬁcking in marijuana weighing between ﬁve and twenty—ﬁve pounds, which
associated with a

mandatory-minimum sentence of three years

in prison.

2732B(a)(1)(B).)

He

sentence

V.

cannot argue that a mandatory

minimum

(R., p. 160;

is

excessive.

LC.

§

is

37-

mm

Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 797, 69 P.3d 1052, 1058 (2003) (holding that defendant could not

challenge a mandatory

sentence

minimum

was required

indeterminate.

E

LC.

to

§

sentence as excessive).

Because the three-year portion 0f his

be ﬁxed, neither can he argue

that

it

should have been partially

37-2732B(a)(1)(B) (requiring a “mandatory

three years); State V. Ephraim,

minimum ﬁxed term” of

152 Idaho 176, 179, 267 P.3d 1291, 1294
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(Ct.

App. 2011)

(holding that mandatory

minimum

requested a three-year mandatory

9-13.)

He

m,

ﬁxed

sentences are

sentences).

minimum term 0f imprisonment

cannot then argue 0n appeal that the

district court erred

110 Idaho 613, 614, 716 P.2d 1385, 1386

doctrine precludes a defendant from

(Ct.

at sentencing.

by imposing

m

(Tr., p. 111, Ls.

one.

E

App. 1986) (holding

that the invited error

particular sentence

and then arguing on

recommending a

appeal that the district court erred by imposing

Further, he speciﬁcally

it).

Randall’s argument With respect to his sentence, then, must be limited t0 the four-year

indeterminate period.

be paroled

In reviewing that portion 0f his sentence, this Court assumes that he will

at his ﬁrst opportunity.

“apparently contends that

after

he

is

it is

Lver, 144

Idaho

at

727, 170 P.3d at 392.

He

therefore

unreasonable for him to be on parole supervision for four years

released from incarceration.”

Li

In support of that claim, he points t0 his family

support and his regret about having trafﬁcked marijuana. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 24-25.)

The record supports

Though

the district court’s exercise of sentencing discretion.

Randall pled guilty t0 a Violation 0f LC. § 37-2732B(a)(1)(B), trafﬁcking between ﬁve and

twenty—ﬁve pounds 0f marijuana, he admitted t0 a more serious Violation 0f LC.
2732(B)(a)(1)(C), trafﬁcking between twenty—ﬁve and one hundred pounds of marijuana.
p. 5 (admitting that

actually

committed

2732(B)(a)(1)(C).

he was trafﬁcking sixty—ﬁve pounds of marijuana).7)
is

associated With a mandatory

minimum of ﬁve

In addition, Randall received an

moderate risk to reoffend. (PSI,

p. 12.)

He

7

References to “PSI” are t0 the ﬁle

Volume

1,”

titled

which includes the presentence

years in prison.

LSI-R score 0f 22, reﬂecting

stated that

and reported “severe substance use problems” (PSI,

The offense

he

is

p. 20).

that

37-

§

(PSI,

that

LC.

§

he
37-

he was a

a daily user of marijuana (PSI, p. 9),

The

district court

could reasonably

“Appeal Certiﬁcate 0f Exhibits Conﬁdential PSI

report.

30

conclude

that, in addition t0

programming while

in prison, both Randall

beneﬁt from a period 0f supervision following his
P.3d

at

392 (holding

that four-year period

substance abuse issues).

release.

E M,

and the public would
144 Idaho

at

of supervised release was reasonable in

727, 170

light

Finally, the district court noted that the indeterminate portion

of

of the

sentence would be beneﬁcial as motivation to ensure that Randall does well in the prison setting.

(T12, p. 115, Ls. 2-15.)

That consideration too suggests that the sentence was reasonable.

State V. Wright, 134 Idaho 79, 84,

996 P.2d 298, 303 (2000) (holding

0f sentence was not excessive where

it

was intended by

E

that indeterminate portion

the district court, in part, to provide

“leverage 0r motivation” t0 ensure rehabilitation and good behavior in prison).

Notwithstanding the allegedly mitigating factors to Which Randall points, and about

which the

district court

was well-aware, Randall has not shown

that the district court

abused

sentencing discretion by requiring Randall t0 submit to four years of supervised release.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court to afﬁrm the judgment of the

DATED this 24th day of January, 2020.

/s/

Andrew V. Wake

ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General

31

district court.
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